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Abstract
A two-country general equilibrium model with large wage setters and conservative
monetary authorities is employed to investigate the welfare implications of three interna-
tional monetary regimes: i) non-cooperative, ii) cooperative, and iii) monetary union. The
analysis shows that the unions’ wage claims depend on three strategic effects which are
substantially different between the international policy arrangements. In contrast with re-
cent studies, a switch from non-cooperation to monetary union is welfare improving with
a sufficiently conservative central bank because unions perceive wage hikes as delivering
lower terms-of-trade gains; while a switch from non-cooperation to cooperation is always
beneficial because wage hikes do not yield any terms-of-trade gain. Finally, the paper
qualifies Lippi’s (2003) findings about the real effects of central bank conservatism and
centralized wage bargaining.
Keywords: Central bank conservatism, non-atomistic wage setting, open-economy macro,
monetary regime
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1 Introduction
The European Monetary Union has changed the way macroeconomic policy is conducted in Eu-
rope. According to theoretical models on strategic interaction between monetary policy-making
∗I wish to thank Alberto Dalmazzo and Charles Wyplosz for detailed comments on an earlier version of this
paper. I also benefited from many helpful comments of participants in the 16th AISSEC conference (Parma), the
12th Spring Meeting of Young Economists (Hamburg), and the 11th ZEI International Summer School (Bad Hon-
nef). Financial support by the Italian Ministry of Universities and Scientific Research is gratefully acknowledged.
The usual disclaimer applies.
†EPFL, ODY 2 17 (Odyssea), Station 5, CH-1015 Lausanne (Switzerland); Tel.: +41-21-6930068; Fax: +41-
21-6930060; vincenzo.cuciniello@epfl.ch
1
and wage setters, a union-wide monetary policy is expected to reduce the extent to which each
union internalizes the inflationary repercussions of its wage demands, thereby boosting wage
claims (Soskice and Iversen, 1998; Cukierman and Lippi, 2001). In this respect, two strate-
gic mechanisms have been explored in the literature.1 Cukierman and Lippi (2001) show that,
in a monetary union, large unions internalizes less the repercussions of their own actions on
the union-average wages. It turns out that the switch from non-cooperative national monetary
policies to a monetary union is likely to raise unemployment because each individual union per-
ceives to improve its relative wage to a larger extent. Soskice and Iversen (1998), instead, argue
that the establishment of a monetary regime has negative effects on economic performance be-
cause each union anticipates that its wage demand has a limited effect on the union-average
inflation level and, hence, on the monetary wage response policies. However, there is evidence
that inflationary pressures stemming from the labor markets have remained moderate since the
formation of the EMU in Europe (European Commision, 2007).
A shortcoming of this literature is that the argument on the monetary union regime hinges
only on strategic interaction between wage setters and a single monetary authority without con-
sidering the possibility for domestic unions of affecting the foreign labor market via an adverse
“beggar-thy-neighbor” effect. The main reason is that the findings in Cukierman and Lippi
(2001) and Soskice and Iversen (1998) under non-cooperative monetary policies are derived
in a closed-economy setup.2 This paper adds to the above literature by introducing an open-
economy dimension in a micro-founded model where a monetary regime can affect welfare per
se. Specifically, labor unions internalize the terms-of-trade effect associated with their wage
choice that, in turn, depends on the monetary regime set up.3
To address the implication of monetary regimes for wage-setting decisions, I use a two-
country model where each country is specialized in the production of a good, wages are rigid
and there is no international price discrimination. Within this framework, I assess three types
of international policy arrangements: (i) cooperative, (ii) non-cooperative and (iii) monetary
union. First, I show that under non-cooperation and monetary union non-atomistic wage setters
are induced to strategically move the terms of trade. Since both domestic and foreign mon-
etary policies are common knowledge for labor unions, a domestic wage increase improves
the terms of trade through the monetary policy responses toward domestic wages in the two
countries. This, clearly depends on the degree of central bank (CB) conservatism. In particular,
if foreign CB conservatism is limited, a switch from non-cooperation to monetary union im-
1Gru¨ner and Hefeker (1999) consider a single monopoly union in each country which is inflation averse per se.
A monetary union regime has real effects in their model through this channel. In the paper, however, I will focus
on standard unions’ preferences without allowing for money illusion. See Cukierman (2004) for a recent survey
on strategic interactions between non-atomistic wage setters and monetary policy.
2Cavallari (2004) allows for a two-country open economy setup under non-cooperation, but domestic unions
do not internalize the impact of their wage demand on the foreign monetary policy and, therefore, on the foreign
labor market.
3In a first generation of game-theoretic models a` la Canzoneri and Henderson (1988), Jensen (1993) shows that
the real exchange rate appreciation drives a wedge between the consumption and production real wage, thereby
inducing unions to be more aggressive in their wage requests.
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proves welfare even when all the structural features of the domestic country, such as the level
of inflation-aversion of the CB and the wage bargaining system, are unaltered because unions
perceive wage hikes as delivering less terms-of-trade gains. Second, in a cooperative regime
the monetary authorities as well as labor unions perceive that they cannot affect the terms of
trade, thereby inducing wage restraint. This model suggests, in contrast with the New Open
Economy Macroeconomics literature,4 that there are gains from cooperation even when the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution are equal to one. Finally, the paper encompasses all strategic effects investigated
in the literature within a single framework and extends the Lippi’s (2003) analysis of welfare
effects of a conservative CB and centralized wage setting in a closed economy, identifying dif-
ferent conditions determining the sign of the impact of conservatism and centralization in wage
setting on economic performance.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2, and Section 3
discusses the game equilibrium. Section 4 details the welfare results of the three monetary
regime, while Section 5 focuses on the real effects of CB conservatism and centralized wage
setting. Section 6 concludes.
2 Economic setup
Building on Lippi (2003), I analyze the strategic interactions between monetary policy and
labor market in a micro-founded framework with non-atomistic wage setters. I extend his
model to a two-country general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic
competition in line with the new open economy macroeconomics literature (e.g. Corsetti and
Pesenti, 2001).
The economy consists of two equally-sized countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). Each
country is specialized in the production of a single traded good and is inhabited by a continuum
of agents (with population size normalized to 1) and a finite number of unions (n > 1). I
assume no impediments or costs to trade across borders. Production of the Home (Foreign)
good requires a continuum of differentiated labor inputs indexed by [0,1] which are supplied
by Home (Foreign) households.
Wages are contractually fixed for one period (contract period).5 The assumption of sticky
wages allows monetary policy to affect real variables at least in the contract period. Specifically,
I assume that at the beginning of the contract period, non-atomistic unions simultaneously
set nominal wages in their country of origin. Next, monetary policies are conducted by two
national monetary authorities that choose monetary stance, i.e. money supplies. I consider
three alternative monetary regimes: Nash equilibrium, international policy coordination, and
monetary union. The prevailing monetary regime is always known to unions when setting
4E.g. Benigno and Benigno (2006), Devereux and Engel (2003), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002).
5Multiperiod dynamics are not central to the strategic effects I will explore here.
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their wages. Finally, firms hire labor from households at the previously determined wages and
money supplies.
2.1 Technology
Perfectly competitive final good firms hire aggregate labor to produce output according to the
production function6
Y = Lα ; Y ∗ = (L∗)α 0 < α < 1, (1)
where Y and Y ∗ denote output per capita in the Home and Foreign country respectively.7 La-
bor indexes L and L∗ are Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators defined over the quantities hired of each
differentiated labor type
L =
[∫ 1
0
L( j)
σ−1
σ d j
] σ
σ−1
; L∗ =
[∫ 1
0
L∗( j∗)
σ−1
σ d j∗
] σ
σ−1
σ > 1. (2)
2.2 Agents’ payoffs
Households
The household j ∈ [0,1] derives utility from consumption, holdings of real balances, and leisure
as follows:8
U( j) = logC( j)− k
2
[logL( j)]2+χ log
(
M( j)
P
)
k > α, χ > 0, (3)
where M/P denotes real money balances, L expresses the amount of labor supplied, and C is
a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over the two available types of goods, i.e. the Home and Foreign
goods:
C =CγHC
1−γ
F 0 < γ < 1, (4)
where CH and CF are respectively consumption of the Home-produced and of the Foreign-
produced traded good. The consumption-based price index expressed in domestic currency is
defined as
P =
1
γγ(1− γ)1−γ P
γ
HP
1−γ
F , (5)
where PH and PF are the prices of Home and Foreign goods expressed in Home currency.
Foreign agents are modeled in an analogous way.
6Monopolistic competition in the product market does not qualitatively alter the main results of the paper.
7Henceforth, Foreign variables will be indicated by “*”.
8In order to have a utility function decreasing and concave in equilibrium leisure, the assumption k > α must
hold (see eqs. (45) and (33)).
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Central banks
In each country monetary policy is conducted by a conservative CB. I draw on Lippi (2003)
and assume that the domestic CB’s objective is
Ω =
∫ 1
0
[
logC( j)− k
2
[logL( j)]2
]
d j− β
2
p2 β > 0, (6)
where the parameter β captures the degree of CB conservatism (Rogoff, 1985) and p≡ logP.9
If the level of conservatism is zero, the CB is a benevolent planner that cares only about agents’
welfare.10
Similarly, the Foreign CB’s objective is given by
Ω∗ =
∫ 1
0
[
logC∗( j∗)− k
2
[logL∗( j∗)]2
]
d j∗− β
∗
2
p∗2 β ∗ > 0. (7)
Notice that Home and Foreign CBs have different preferences toward inflation, respectively β
and β ∗.
Unions
Workers are organized in n > 1 labor unions. I assume that all labor types are unionized and
equally distributed among unions. Therefore, each union u has mass 1/n(=
∫
j∈u d j). In such
a setup, both the level of collective bargaining coverage and the unions’ ability to internalize
the consequences of their actions are proportional to the union’s size: the smaller the number
of unions, the more they internalize the impact of their wage settlement on aggregate wage.
I assume that the representative Home union u acts benevolently by maximizing the utility
of its members (of mass 1/n) and disregarding liquidity effects:
Vu = n
∫
j∈u
[
logC( j)− k
2
[logL( j)]2
]
d j. (8)
Notice that unions’ objective differs from the CB’s objective in that the unions consider only a
fraction of agents in the country and do not care about inflation.11
9In what follows, I will denote natural logarithm of any variable X by the corresponding lower-case letter; thus
x ≡ logX . Without loss of generality, I normalize the previous period nominal wage, money supply, and general
price level to unity, so that the log of these variables can be considered as an approximation of their percentage
increase.
10Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), the monetary authority focuses on the
“real” component of welfare, abstracting from the utility of real balances.
11The benevolent union hypothesis is in line with the trade union behavior surveyed by Oswald (1985), whose
objective function usually includes real wages and unemployment.
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3 Equilibrium
I assume a one-shot three-stage game. In the first stage of the game, each union sets the nominal
wage growth in an uncoordinated way. They have full information about the reaction functions
of CBs and of firms, and take them into account in the wage setting process. In other words,
each union acts strategically as Stackelberg leaders against the CBs and firms, and plays a game
Nash with other unions. The equilibrium of this wage-setting game determines the growth of
nominal wages in the two countries.
In the second stage, the two CBs choose their money growth simultaneously under three
alternative monetary regimes. The first is a Nash equilibrium: each CB sets the domestic mon-
etary stance taking the other CB’s money supply as given; the second is an international policy
coordination: the two CBs maximize a joint welfare function; the third is a monetary union,
which differs from a cooperative policy regime because there is only one policy instrument
available. Under either regime, monetary authorities take previously set wages as given and
anticipate the impact of their monetary stance on firms’ decision.
In the third and last stage, production and trade take place through the firms and households’
decisions. After observing nominal wage and money balances, each firm decides the optimal
amount of labor to hire so as to maximize its profits, while households consume goods and
supply the required labor services. The resulting string of first order conditions simultaneously
determine the general price level, consumption and employment.
The choice of modeling the game between unions, CBs and firms as a Stackelberg game
is in line with the literature on strategic interactions between the CB and unions (e.g. Soskice
and Iversen, 1998, 2000; Bratsiotis and Martin, 1999). Moreover it reflects the fact that wage
contract are usually fixed for at least one year while prices and money supplies can be adjusted
more frequently than annually. General equilibrium is characterized by solving the game using
backward induction.
3.1 Production and Trade
For a given level of production, the demand for labor type j by each firm solves the dual
problem of minimizing total cost,
∫ 1
0 W ( j)L( j)d j, subject to the employment index (2):
L( j) =
[
W ( j)
W
]−σ
L ; L( j∗) =
[
W ∗( j∗)
W ∗
]−σ
L∗, (9)
where W ( j) denotes the nominal wage of labor type j and W is the nominal wage index defined
as
W =
[∫ 1
0
W ( j)1−σ d j
] 1
1−σ
; W ∗ =
[∫ 1
0
W ∗( j∗)1−σ d j∗
] 1
1−σ
. (10)
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These wage indexes have the property that the minimum cost of employing an array of labor
types L( j) is given by WL. Therefore, from profit maximization, aggregate labor demands are
given by
L =
[
1
α
W
PH
]− 11−α
; L∗ =
[
1
α
W ∗
P∗F
]− 11−α
. (11)
In the absence of of market segmentation across countries, the law of one price holds:
PF = E P∗F ; P
∗
H = PH/E , (12)
where E is the nominal exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of foreign currency).
Each j-th household owns equal shares of all domestic firms and of an initial stock of
the domestic currency. Markets are complete domestically and international equity trade is
forbidden.12
A typical Home agent j maximizes (3) with respect to C( j) and M( j) subject to the budget
constraint
M( j)
P
+C( j) =
M0( j)
P
+T +D( j)+
W ( j)L( j)
P
, (13)
where T denotes per capita real transfers from the Home government, W ( j)L( j)P represents real
labor income, D( j) expresses real domestic profits, and M0( j) are initial nominal money hold-
ings. Foreign individuals face an analogous problem.
The first-order conditions for Home and Foreign households yield the following money
demands:
1
C( j)
= χ
(
M( j)
P
)−1
;
1
C∗( j∗)
= χ
(
M∗( j∗)
P∗
)−1
. (14)
Since money has value only for the current period, individuals equate the marginal utility from
holding it with the opportunity cost of acquiring it.
The labor supply will be derived below solving the unions’ problem. Labor unions are in
fact in charge of wage-setting decisions, while households supply whatever quantity of labor is
required to clear the markets for a given wage.
Government in each country rebates all seignorage revenue in lump-sum transfers to house-
holds:
T =
M
P
− M0
P
; T ∗ =
M∗
P∗
− M
∗
0
P∗
. (15)
From the optimal allocation of consumption for Home and Foreign households (i.e. mini-
mization of total cost of consumption subject to a target value of consumption), the total output
12Note that, given the Cobb-Douglas preferences over traded goods (4) and assuming zero initial non-monetary
wealth, international equity trade would not affect equilibrium allocation (see e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001).
This implies that current accounts would be zero in an intertemporal version of the model as well.
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demands are given by
YH =
γ
PH
(PC+E P∗C∗) ; Y ∗F =
1− γ
PF
(PC+E P∗C∗), (16)
which, in turn, imply the following result
PHYH
PFY ∗F
=
γ
1− γ . (17)
Now, using eq. (15) together with the household’s budget constraints (13) leads to
PC = PHYH ; E P∗C∗ = PC∗ = PFY ∗F , (18)
i.e. the current account is always balanced. It is then straightforward to show that the ratio of
Home to Foreign consumption is constant
C
C∗
=
γ
1− γ . (19)
The exchange rate is therefore given by the ratio of Home to Foreign nominal expenditure:
E =
PC
P∗C∗
. (20)
This result stems directly from the characteristics of current account balance and constant ex-
penditure shares exhibited by the model. Notice that, from the money demand (14), the ex-
change rate can be rewritten as the ratio of money supplies in the two countries as follows:
E =
M
M∗
. (21)
Furthermore, the terms of trade are defined in the Home country as
TOT ≡ E P
∗
F
PH
. (22)
A decrease in TOT constitutes a real appreciation of the domestic currency, i.e. an improvement
in the Home terms of trade.
The rest of the paper will show how terms-of-trade adjustments and monetary conservatism
play a key role in determining the welfare impact of wage demand.
3.2 Monetary policy
I draw on Corsetti (2008) to model international monetary regimes and assume that the mon-
etary authority aims to solve the following problems: in a Nash equilibrium (NE), the Home
8
CB problem is
max
m
∫ 1
0
[
logC( j)− k
2
[logL( j)]2
]
d j− β
2
p2, (23)
taking m∗ as given. Similarly, the Foreign CB problem is
max
m∗
∫ 1
0
[
logC∗( j∗)− k
2
[logL∗( j∗)]2
]
d j∗− β
∗
2
p∗2, (24)
taking m as given. The international policy coordination (CO) problem is given by
max
m,m∗
1
2
∫ 1
0
[
logC( j)− k
2
[logL( j)]2
]
d j+
1
2
∫ 1
0
[
logC∗( j∗)− k
2
[logL∗( j∗)]2
]
d j∗− β
W
2
pˆ2,
(25)
where βW > 0 and pˆ ≡ (p+ p∗)/2 is union-average price level. In a monetary union (MU),
the problem is equal to (25) but subject to the constraint m = m∗. Moreover, each of the above
maximization problem is subject to (11), (14), (16), (21) and wages are taken as given.
Under the three monetary regimes, the first-order conditions with respect to m yields
pNE =
k(l˜− lNE)−α(1− γ)
(1−αγ)β , (26)
pˆCO =
k(2γ l˜− lCO)
(1−2αγ)βW , (27)
pˆMU = pMU =
k(l˜− lˆMU)
(1−α)βW , (28)
where l˜ ≡ α/k is the efficient employment level derived in Appendix A (see eq. (45)), and
lˆ ≡ (l+ l∗)/2 is the union-average employment level.
Consider the symmetric case of γ = 1/2 and β = βW . Since employment lr with r ∈
{NE,CO,ME} is sub-optimally low owing to monopolistic distortions in labor markets, the
monetary authority has an incentive to raise inflation so as to reduce the discrepancy between
efficient and natural output. This is the standard Blanchard-Kiyotaki result (captured by the
term l˜− lr), whereby a positive monetary shock unambiguously improves domestic welfare
in a closed economy (Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987). Nevertheless, as noted by Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001), in an open economy this effect is not sufficient to prevent a deflationary mon-
etary policy.13 Intuitively, when monetary policies are uncoordinated, a money contraction
reduces both consumption and output. But it also improves the terms of trade, thereby increas-
ing consumption and reducing output further. It turns out that the reduction in the disutility of
supplying labor services more than offsets the reduction in the utility from lower consumption,
because the “burden” of production is shifted to the other country through the improved terms
13For an empirical evidence that relatively open countries experience lower inflation see Romer (1993), Lane
(1997), and Campillo and Miron (1997).
9
of trade. Such an effect is captured by the term α(1− γ) on the R.H.S. of eq. (26) and it is not
present under coordinated monetary policies.
Result 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, a switch from non-cooperative to cooperative monetary
policies entails a higher inflation.
The proof is straightforward.
Comparing eqs. (28), (27), and (26), it appears that eqs. (28) and (27) are always above eq.
(26) in the (l, p) space. Thus, moving from non-cooperation to a monetary union or monetary
policy cooperation induces a more expansionary monetary policy due to the disappearance of
the terms-of-trade externality. Maximizing the union-wide utility, the CB in fact internalizes
the impossibility of improving the terms of trade in both countries.
Before the formation of the EMU, monetary policy in Germany hinged on interactions
between German labor unions and the monetary policy of the Bundesbank. According to Re-
sult 1, did the ECB obtain autonomy and conservatism equal to the Bundesbank, the ECB
monetary-policy stance on the German economy would have been more expansionary relative
to the Bundesbank, thereby triggering higher inflation. In this respect, Result 1 also provides a
rationale for having appointed a more conservative ECB (Piga, 2000).
Before turning to the wage-setting solution, I write the level of employment perceived by
unions after having substituted the money supply solutions (see Appendix B for details):
l = εrHw+ εrFw∗ l∗ = εrF∗w∗+ εrH∗w, r ∈ {NE,CO,MU}. (29)
3.3 Wage setting
Controlling the growth of the nominal wage u, w(u), the u-th union anticipates that
∂W
∂w(u)
=
1
n
(
W (u)
W
)−σ
(30)
taking other unions’ wages both at Home and abroad as given (see Appendix C). Eq. (30) is
key to understand the model results. As long as n is finite, an increase in the union’s wage
affects aggregate wage which, in turn, reduces aggregate employment by eqs. (29). In addition,
a rise in w(u) reduces also labor type demands through the elasticity of substitution σ , since
firms substitute the u-th labor variety for the other labor types. In a symmetric equilibrium (i.e.
when W (u) = W ), the elasticities of Home labor demand to nominal wage of union u, under
the monetary regime r is
εrh ≡
∂ lr(u)
∂w(u)
=−σ
(
1− 1
n
)
+
1
n
εrH . (31)
Eq. (31) defines the elasticity of domestic labor demand perceived by the u-th union as
a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution between labor types and the elasticity of
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domestic aggregate labor demand. It turns out that, with atomistic wage setters (n → ∞), eq.
(31) is simply formed by the elasticity of substitution, and unions do not take into account the
impact of their wage claims on aggregate employment. The role of the elasticity of aggregate
labor demand in eq. (31) is instead increasing in the union’s size (lower n). With a single all-
encompassing union (n= 1) each labor-type service receives the same wage, thereby preventing
any substitution effect between labor types from operating.
The domestic monetary response to domestic wages has been recently investigated in the
literature (e.g. Lippi, 2002, 2003; Cavallari, 2004; Coricelli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo, 2004;
Gnocchi, 2006), while the foreign monetary response to domestic wages has been ignored by
these studies. However, since in an open economy both Home and Foreign monetary policies
are common knowledge for the u-th union, a large union internalizes the impact of its wage
demands on Foreign labor markets as well. Thus, from eqs. (29), a change in w(u) affects
Foreign employment as follows:
εrh∗ ≡
∂ l∗r
∂w(u)
=
1
n
εrH∗. (32)
Intuitively, an increase in the Home nominal wage u leads to higher inflation in the Foreign
country because of the rise in pH . As a result, for a given exchange rate, the corresponding
(optimal) Foreign monetary policy balances the burden of the welfare loss between employ-
ment and inflation by moving employment and inflation into the opposite direction (see eqs.
(26),(27), and (28)) so that Foreign employment falls in the wake of Home wage claims.
A representative union u maximizes (8) with respect to w(u) subject to (9), (13), and (29).
In the symmetric equilibrium W (u) = W , equilibrium employment under the three monetary
regimes is then (see Appendix D):
lr = l˜
(
1− 1
ηr
)
, r ∈ {NE,CO,MU} (33)
where ηr ≡ −dlogL(u)r/dlog(W (u)/Pr) > 1 is the real consumption wage elasticity (in ab-
solute value) of the perceived demand for labor type j ∈ u in regime r. It is apparent that, as
long as η is finite, equilibrium employment is below the efficient level l˜ in each regime. More
specifically, a lower labor demand elasticity implies that, for a given level of employment, nom-
inal wage hikes yield higher marginal benefits in terms of consumption, thereby reducing wage
restraints. In other words, η is a measure of the monopolistic power of unions. Rewriting eq.
(33) as
1
ηr
=
1− srh
εrh
=
l˜− lr
l˜
, (34)
where srh ≡ ∂ logPr/∂ logW (u) is the elasticity of CPI to nominal wage u, the elasticity of labor
demand to real wages measures the percentage deviation of natural employment from efficient
employment. The lower η , the higher is the perceived real wage obtained by unions in the wake
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of nominal wage claims.
Note that the term sh ∈ (0,1) in (34) reduces the monopolistic distortion in the labor market
through a decrease in real labor income. Similarly, an increase in labor demand elasticity to
nominal wage εh implies that, for a given increase in w(u), the reduction in employment and
hence in labor income is more considerable. It turns out that an increase in εh and sh leads to
lower wage demands.
Now, from eqs. (26), (27), (28) and (33) the equilibrium rate of inflation with γ = 1/2 is
given by:
pNE =
α/ηNE −α/2
(1−α/2)β , (35)
pCO =
α/ηCO
(1−α)βW , (36)
pMU =
α/ηMU
(1−α)βW . (37)
The key implication of the above expressions is that both a monetary union and a cooperative
regime feature an inflation bias while, a non-cooperative regime may trigger a deflation bias.
As noted in Section 3.2, for a given degree of CB conservatism, equilibrium inflation is lower
under a Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, under such a regime, monetary authorities are induced
to resort to surprise monetary contractions because they perceive to affect the terms of trade.
Conversely, the economy as a whole is not affected by the terms of trade externality, thereby
leading monetary authorities to a more expansionary monetary policy under cooperation and
monetary union regimes (see Section 3.2).
The next sections will show how different institutions, in particular international monetary
regimes, centralized wage setting, and CB conservatism cause workers to modify their wage
claims.
4 The effect of monetary regime
This section assesses the role of a monetary regime per se. In order to disentangle the strategic
mechanisms operating in ηr, it is convenient to rewrite the elasticities of labor demand to real
wages as follows:
ηr =
 1σ︸︷︷︸
substitution
effect
(
1− ε
r
H
nεrh
)
+(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
output
effect
εrH
nεrh
+α(1− γ)
(
εrH − εrH∗
εrH
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
terms-of-trade effect
εrH
nεrh

−1
, (38)
where ε
r
H
nεrh
∈ (0,1).
The incentive to set a higher nominal wage w(u) depends on three effects.
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First, since other unions’ policy is taken as given, the u-th union perceives to increase
its wage relative to the other unions’ wage. More specifically, for a unit increase in the u-th
union’s wage, the increase in w(u) relative to others is higher, the lower the impact on aggregate
wage. However, the aggregate wage adjusts according to the aggregate labor elasticity which,
in turn, is increasing in the tightness of monetary policy responses toward wages. Thus, the
more accommodating the monetary policy, the more aggressive wage demands are, since wage
setters anticipate the possibility of achieving higher wage deviations from the other unions’
wages. This effect is captured by the first term in eq. (38) and, drawing on Lippi’s (2003)
terminology, is labeled “substitution effect”.
Notice that, as long as the direct effect of w(u) on w (i.e. 1/n) is less than one, the u-th
union has an incentive to exploit its monopolistic power on the labor services market. In the
extreme case of a single all-encompassing union (n = 1), εrh is equal to ε
r
H , and this nullifies
the substitution effect. A wage rise, in this case, leads to an equal proportional increase in
aggregate wage without any possibility for the union of increasing its relative wage.
Second, the u-th union anticipates that its real production wage (i.e., w(u)− pH) increases
in the wake of a nominal wage rise through the reduction in aggregate output. This effect is
captured by the second term in eq. (38) and, drawing on Lippi’s (2003) terminology, is labeled
“output effect”. Specifically, from eq. (11), a nominal wage demand raises the real production
wage through the elasticity of aggregate employment to real production wage (1−α)−1.
In a closed economy (γ = 1), the producer price index coincides with the consumer price in-
dex. Therefore, in Lippi (2003) the output and substitution effects are the sole effects taken into
account by unions in their wage setting process. Indeed eq. (38) reveals that ηr is constituted
by the output and substitution effect, but is further reduced by a third effect: the improvement
in the terms of trade.
For simplicity, consider the case where the weights in the utility function eq. (4) are the
same as country size, i.e. γ = 1/2, and the degree of domestic CB conservatism coincides with
the union-wide conservatism, i.e. β = βW .
Result 2 As a result of a nominal wage rise,
i. under a non-cooperative regime a domestic union expects an improvement in the terms
of trade larger than the one obtained in a monetary union in presence of a sufficiently
conservative CB, i.e. when β > k+β
∗(1−α/2)
α(1−α) ;
ii. under international policy coordination a domestic union does not perceive that it can
affect the terms of trade.
Each union anticipates that a wage rise improves the terms of trade as long as there is a
difference between the elasticity of domestic and foreign aggregate employment to domestic
wages (see Table 1). Specifically under a non-cooperative and monetary union regime, the
Home employment elasticity to Home wage (εCOH and εMUH ) is (in absolute value) larger than the
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Foreign employment elasticity to Home wage (εCOH∗ and εMUH∗ ). Thus, the terms of trade improve,
reducing the consumer price index and raising the real consumption wage (w(u)− p). This
mechanism encourages nominal wage demands and is labeled “terms-of-trade effect”. Notice
that the terms-of-trade effect is curbed by the degree of foreign and domestic CB conservatism,
respectively under a non-cooperative and monetary union regime. Under a Nash equilibrium
a higher β ∗ in fact increases the (absolute) elasticity of foreign labor demand to home wages,
thereby reducing the (absolute) difference between εH and ε∗H (see Cuciniello, 2009). It turns
out that, if the monetary union CB is enough conservative, i.e. β > k+β
∗(1−α/2)
α(1−α) , the terms-of-
trade effect is larger under a non-cooperative regime than in a monetary union.
Conversely, under a cooperative regime Home and Foreign labor demand elasticities to
Home wages are equal, and the terms-of-trade effect is prevented from operating. The monetary
authorities in fact internalizes the terms-of-trade externality and, having at their disposal two
instruments, react asymmetrically to inflationary wage claims in the two countries. Intuitively,
for a given monetary stance, a domestic nominal wage increase has the same effect on inflation
at Home and abroad but only affects domestic employment. Thus, domestic monetary stance
will be more expansionary while foreign monetary stance tighter. In such a way they equate
the marginal benefit of a higher employment with the marginal cost of a lower employment
abroad. With the symmetric parametrization assumed above, the two monetary responses are
such that the elasticity of aggregate labor demand to domestic wages are equal. Therefore,
under a cooperative regime, the real consumption wage elasticity of the perceived labor demand
corresponds to the real production wage elasticity, as in a closed-economy framework.
What is then the direct effect of a monetary regime on the labor demand elasticity η? To
answer this question, I first assume that wage setting is highly centralized, i.e. n = 1. In such a
case, the wage bargaining system is fully centralized, and the substitution effect is absent in η .
It turns out that
Result 3 When labor markets are characterized by nationally defined systems of collective
bargaining,i.e. n = 1:
• a move from a non-cooperative to cooperative regime is always welfare improving;
• a move from a non-cooperative regime to a monetary union is beneficial if β > k+β ∗(1−α/2)α(1−α) .
The proof is straightforward.
From eq. (38), with a single all-encompassing union (n = 1) the labor type demand elastic-
ity (εh) coincides with the aggregate labor demand elasticity to wage (εH) so that the following
relation holds:
ηNE
∣∣
n=1 =
[
1−α + α
2
(
εNEH − εNEH∗
εNEH
)]−1
< ηMU
∣∣
n=1 =
[
1−α + α
2
(
εMUH − εMUH∗
εMUH
)]−1
ηMU
∣∣
n=1 < η
CO∣∣
n=1 = [1−α]−1 (39)
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where
εNEH −εNEH∗
εNEH
> 0 and
εMUH −εMUH∗
εMUH
> 0. Moreover, using Result 2 and the fact that the equilibrium
level of employment (33) is equal in the two countries, welfare can be rewritten in equilibrium
as:
u = αl− k
2
l2 = u∗,
which is clearing increasing in l as long as employment is below its efficient level l˜.
Before analyzing the more general case of n > 1, it would be interesting to assess the
“relative size” of all effects entering in η . The α parameter in the model measures the aggregate
labor share, whose values are usually in the interval 0.55− 0.65 (e.g. Kongsamut, Rebelo,
and Xie, 2001). Microeconomic evidence and calibrated models instead suggest values for
the elasticity of substitution not smaller than 2.5 and not greater than 21 (e.g. Griffin, 1992;
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005). This implies that σ > 11−α2 . In accordance with
this, the following result holds.
Result 4
• A move from a non-cooperative regime to a monetary union is beneficial, i.e. ηMU >
ηNE , if β > β¯ ∗.
• A move from a non-cooperative to cooperative regime is always welfare improving, i.e.
ηCO > ηNE .
The formation of a monetary union has two contrasting effects on real labor demand elas-
ticity. First, the disappearance of exchange rate movements and the impossibility of strategi-
cally improving the terms of trade induce the CB to a more accommodating monetary policy
(see Section 3.2). This in part reduces the labor demand elasticity to a real production wage
perceived by unions, and increases wage aggressiveness relative to a non-cooperative regime.
Secondly, in presence of a sufficiently conservative monetary authority, β > β¯ ∗,14 the incentive
to a strategic use of the terms of trade (i.e., the terms-of-trade effect) causes unions to demand
a higher wage under a Nash equilibrium relative to a monetary union. From Results 4 and 2,
it turns out that the incentive to set higher wages is nevertheless discouraged in a monetary
14Where
β¯ ∗ ≡ (2−α)β
∗(2+α(−5+2α)−2n(1+(−3+α)α)+2(n−1)(1−α)(1−2α)σ)
4n(1−α)α2
+
1
4n(2−α)(1−α)α2
(
2k(2−α)(2−4α +n(−2+5α))+2k(n−1)(4+α(−12+7α))σ +
√
∆
2)
,
∆ ≡ 16k(n−1)n(−2+α)(−1+α)α2 (4k+(−2+α)2β ∗)(σ −1)
+(−2k(−2+α)(2−4α +n(−2+5α))+2k(−1+n)(4+α(−12+7α))σ
+(−2+α)2β ∗ (2−2n−5α +6nα +2α2−2nα2+2(n−1)(−1+α)(−1+2α)σ)
and β¯ ∗ < k+β
∗(1−α/2)
α(1−α) .
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union since the terms-of-trade channel prevails over the aggregate output channel. Moreover,
in a cooperative monetary regime the terms-of-trade effect disappears and labor unions will set
a lower wage than under a non-cooperative regime.
It is worth noticing that such results are in sharp contrast with most of the predictions
about the effects of a switch from a non-cooperative regime to monetary union regime (e.g.
Cukierman and Lippi, 2001; Soskice and Iversen, 1998). In this literature, the switch from
non-cooperative to monetary union is counter-productive since it reduces the extent to which
each union internalizes the inflationary impact of its wage demand without considering the
role of terms-of-trade effect. Result 4 can hence account for the wage-growth trend in Europe,
which has remained under control since the formation of EMU (European Commision, 2007).
The paper result is also interesting when viewed alongside the results of Jensen (1993, 1997)
and other works on cooperation in the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature. The
traditional approach to international monetary policy coordination in presence of large unions is
built in Jensen (1993, 1997). The main conclusion of his analysis is that, if wage setters do not
care about inflation, policymakers cooperation is counterproductive. In order to obtain positive
effects on economic performance from monetary cooperation, wage setters should also be infla-
tion averse (Jensen, 1997). According to Result 4, an international monetary policy cooperation
is instead beneficial in presence of a conservative CB and non-atomistic wage setting without
resorting to inflation aversion per se. Moreover, in contrast with Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002),
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Benigno and Benigno (2006), and Devereux and Engel (2003),
welfare gains from coordination can be generated in a model with logarithmic consumption
preferences and unitary elasticity of substitution across traded goods, introducing a standard
policy game between non-atomistic wage setters and conservative monetary authorities.
5 The effect of centralization in wage setting and CB conser-
vatism
This section assesses the real effects of the wage-bargaining system and CB conservatism.
To gain an insight, it is convenient to rewrite the real wage elasticity
1
ηr
=
1
σ
(
1− ε
r
H
nεrh
)
+
1
ηr
∣∣
n=1
εrH
nεrh
, (40)
as a weighted average, with weights respectively 1− εrHnεrh and
εrH
nεrh
, of σ−1 and ηr
∣∣−1
n=1.
Note that the “weight” entering in the labor demand elasticity ηr is given by
εrH
nεrh
=
1
1+ σ(n−1)εrH
∈ (0,1). (41)
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From the above expression is hence apparent that n and εrH have two opposing effect on the
weight attached to the elasticity of labor demand to real wage. More specifically, an increase in
the number of unions reduces eq. (41), while an increase in aggregate labor demand elasticity
raises it.
5.1 Collective bargaining coverage
Result 5 An increase in the number of unions, i.e. a more decentralized wage setting, raises
(reduces) welfare and reduces (raises) inflation under the regime r ∈ {NE,MU,CO} if σ >
ηr
∣∣
n=1
(
σ < ηr
∣∣
n=1
)
.
The intuition for this ambiguous result stems from eq. (40). Since 1/ηr is a linear combination
of 1/σ and 1/ηr
∣∣
n=1, an increase in n puts more weight on the substitution effect operating
in the labor demand elasticity, so that employment increases and inflation diminishes only if
σ > ηr
∣∣
n=1 (see eqs. (33), (26), (27), (28), and (40)). Opposite effects occur if σ < η
r
∣∣
n=1.
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Furthermore, since employment is inefficiently low, an increase in labor demand elasticity is
accompanied by an increase in welfare as well. It follows that, an improvement in economic
performance and welfare hinges on complementarity between labor market distortions and cen-
tralization of wage setting. More specifically, labor markets featuring sizeable (limited) mo-
nopolistic distortions has to be associated with centralized (decentralized) wage bargaining.
This result differs from Coricelli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo (2004). They find that a larger
number of unions in a monetary union always worsens economic performance at Home. The
explanation of such a different prediction is due to the absence of a substitution effect in their
model. As labor services are not substitutable in production, the output effect is always larger
than the substitution effect which, in turn, implies that economic performance is unambiguously
decreasing in the decentralization of wage bargaining.
It is worth noticing that the condition in Result 5 referring to a cooperative regime exactly
reproduces Lippi’s (2003) finding. This coincidence is due to the fact that unions perceive
their wages as not having any impact on the terms of trade (see eq. (39)). In other words, the
strategic interactions operating in ηCO are isomorphic to the closed-economy ones. By contrast,
under non-cooperative and monetary union regimes the monetary authorities’ response toward
a domestic wage increase yields terms-of-trade movements. Thus, not only substitution and
output effect matter, but also the terms of trade effect accounts for unions’ wage demands
under these regimes.
15Notice that, for given values of σ and ηr
∣∣
n=1, Result 5 entails a monotonic relation between the degree of
centralization in wage setting and economic performance. This is in contrast with the U-shape curve a` la Calmfors
and Driffill (1988). The main reason for the absence of a Calmfors-Driffill curve is that the model features a
constant elasticity of substitution between labor types (see Guzzo and Velasco, 1999).
17
5.2 CB conservatism
Result 6 As long as n ∈ (1,∞), an increase in CB conservatism raises (reduces) welfare under
the regime r ∈ {NE,MU,CO} if σ < ηr∣∣n=1 (σ > ηr∣∣n=1).
A higher degree of CB inflation aversion implies that monetary policy accommodates wage
hikes to a lesser extent, thus leading to higher (in absolute value) aggregate labor demand
elasticities (εrH). This has two opposing effect on η .
As noted above, the monopolistic distortion in the labor market is simply a weighted av-
erage of the strategic effects 1/σ and 1/ηr
∣∣
n=1, where the weights are given respectively by
1− εNEH
nεNEh
and ε
NE
H
nεNEh
.
Now, an increase in β causes a rise in εrH , thereby increasing the weight attached to the
1/ηr
∣∣
n=1 component (see eq. (41)). As a result, if σ < η
r
∣∣
n=1, a more conservative CB
is beneficial in terms of welfare because it reduces labor market distortions. Conversely, if
σ > ηr
∣∣
n=1, the society would be better off by appointing a less conservative CB. Such a
complementarity between labor market distortions and the degree of conservatism may then
explain the appointment of a more conservative CB on the grounds of monopolistic distortions
in European labor markets.
The ambiguous result in Result 6 is in contrast with Coricelli, Cukierman, and Dalmazzo
(2004) where a more conservative CB always boosts employment in a monetary union. As
previously highlighted, their result hinges on the fact that the production function does not
exhibit any substitution effect. In other words, their prediction is replicated in this model when
the substitution effect is limited, so that conservatism has an increasing effect on employment
in a monetary union.
Finally, as noted in the previous section, Result 6 extends the Lippi’s (2003) findings in two
respects. First, the strategic effects operating in an open economy under a Nash equilibrium
and monetary union include not only the substitution and output effects, but also the terms-of-
trade effect. Second, a cooperative regime replicates his results because of the absence of a
terms-of-trade effect.
6 Conclusions
Wage determination in many European countries is still dominated by high levels of collective
bargaining coverage (e.g. Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel, 2005; International Labour Office,
2008). This paper has studied the welfare implications for non-atomistic wage-setting decisions
of different international monetary policy arrangements, and investigated whether and how
better solutions can be implemented with different degree of central bank (CB) conservatism
and collective wage bargaining systems.
The impact of wage demands on the terms of trade is perceived by unions as being sub-
stantially different between the three monetary regime analyzed. In particular, under non-
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cooperation the responses of domestic and foreign monetary policies to domestic wage hikes
lead unions to anticipate a larger improvement in the terms of trade than in a monetary union
if the degree of foreign CB is limited. As a result, such a gain in the wake of a nominal wage
rise let unions achieve a higher real consumption wage, encouraging wage claims. Conversely,
in a cooperative monetary regime each union anticipates its wage demands not affecting the
terms-of-trade. The absence of such a terms-of-trade effect in this regime leads to larger wage
restraints, thereby raising both employment and welfare relative to the others.
Moreover, the paper highlights how the three international monetary regimes modify the
impact of a centralized system of wage bargaining and CB conservatism on welfare. In gen-
eral, in order to improve economic performance, a higher (lower) degree of conservatism and
centralized wage setting are to be associated with sizeable (lower) distortions in the labor mar-
kets. In this respect, the Lippi’s (2003) result, whereby conservatism of monetary policy and
centralized wage setting affect equilibrium employment only through the output and substi-
tution effect, is modified under non-cooperation and monetary union so as to allow for the
terms-of-trade effect. Conversely, his conditions are replicated in a cooperative regime.
Appendixes
A A benchmark: the efficient allocation
As a benchmark, it is useful to compute the efficient allocation. That is obtained by appointing
a central institution (social planner) that maximizes an objective function represented by a
weighted average of the welfare of the single countries. The world’s optimal allocation in any
given period implies the solution of the following social planner’s problem:
max
Cz,C∗z ,L,L∗,MP ,
M∗
P∗
1
2
∫ 1
0
U( j)d j+
1
2
∫ 1
0
U∗( j∗)d j∗ z ∈ [H,F ],
subject to the feasibility constraint
Y =CH +CF ; Y ∗ =C∗H +C
∗
F
and the technological constraint
Y = Lα ; Y ∗ = (L∗)α .
The optimal conditions for the social planner’s problem are:
γ
CH
=
1− γ
CF
=
k logL
αY
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γ
C∗H
=
1− γ
C∗F
=
k logL∗
αY ∗
χ
(
M
P
)−1
= χ
(
M∗
P∗
)−1
= 0,
i.e. the planner would like to equate the marginal utility of consumption of each tradeable good
to the marginal loss of utility of producing an additional unit of the tradeable good. The last
condition, instead, requires to equate the (social) marginal utility of real balances to the social
marginal cost of producing real money balances, which is zero.
From the resource and technological constraint, it is easy to obtain the following solutions
to the social planner’s problem:
CH = γY ; C∗H = γY ∗ (42)
CF = (1− γ)Y ; C∗F = (1− γ)Y ∗ (43)
Y = Lα =C ; Y ∗ = (L∗)α =C∗ (44)
logL≡ l˜ = α/k ; logL∗ ≡ l˜∗ = α/k. (45)
B Derivation of monetary policies
Before deriving the optimal monetary policies, it is convenient to rewrite the key endogenous
variables obtained in Section 3.1 in terms of nominal money supplies and wages. These vari-
ables are obtained by using eqs. (11), (14),(16), (18), and (22). Apart from constant additive
terms, they are illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Fundamental variables in terms of money supplies and wages
l = m−w l∗ = m∗−w∗ (46)
pH = (1−α)m+αw p∗F = (1−α)m∗+αw∗ (47)
p = pH +(1− γ)tot p∗ = p∗F − γtot (48)
cH = α(m−w) c∗F = α(m∗−w∗) (49)
cF = α(m∗−w∗) c∗H = α(m−w) (50)
c = γcH +(1− γ)cF c∗ = γc∗H +(1− γ)c∗F (51)
tot = α(m−m∗−w+w∗) e = m−m∗ (52)
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Under a non-cooperative regime
Solving (23) and (24) explicitly for money supplies yields, apart from constant additive terms,
the following Nash equilibrium:
m=
k(k−β (1−θ)θ)−ββ ∗(1−θ)θθ ∗+ kβ ∗θ ∗2
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
) w− ββ ∗θ(1−θ ∗)θ ∗
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
)w∗,
m∗=
1− β ∗ (k+βθ 2)θ ∗
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
)
w∗− ββ ∗(1−θ)θθ ∗
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
)w,
where θ ≡ 1− γα and θ ∗ ≡ 1−α(1− γ).
In order to find the aggregate employment elasticities, I plug the Nash solution for money
supplies into (46) as follows:
l =−
βθ
(
k+β ∗θ ∗2
)
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
εNEH
w− ββ
∗θ(1−θ ∗)θ ∗
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
εNEF
w∗,
l∗=− β
∗ (k+βθ 2)θ ∗
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
εNEF∗
w∗− ββ
∗(1−θ)θθ ∗
k2+ββ ∗θθ ∗(1−α)+ k
(
βθ 2+β ∗θ ∗2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
εNEH∗
w.
Under a cooperative regime
Solving (25) explicitly for money supplies yields, apart from constant additive terms, the fol-
lowing cooperative equilibrium:
m=
[
1+
βW −2βW θ
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))
]
w+
βW −2βW θ
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))w
∗,
m∗=
[
1+
βW −2βW θ ∗
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))
]
w∗+
βW −2βW θ ∗
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))w.
In order to find the aggregate employment elasticities, I plug the above solution for money
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supplies into (46) as follows:
l =
βW −2βW θ
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εCOH
w+
βW −2βW θ
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εCOF
w∗,
l∗=
βW −2βW θ ∗
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εCOF∗
w∗+
βW −2βW θ ∗
2(k+βW (1−2(1−θ)θ −2(1−θ ∗)θ ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
εNEH∗
w.
Under a monetary union regime
Solving (25) subject to m = m∗ yields, apart from constant additive terms, the following CB
reaction function:
m = m∗ =
k−2βW (1−θ)(1−α)
2
(
k+βW (1−α)2) w+ k−2βW (1−θ ∗)(1−α)2(k+βW (1−α)2) w∗.
Thus, aggregate employment elasticities are found by plugging the above solution into (46) as
follows:
l =− k+2β
W θ ∗(1−α)
2
(
k+βW (1−α)2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
εMUH
w+
k−2βW (1−θ ∗)(1−α)
2
(
k+βW (1−α)2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
εMUF
w∗,
l∗ =− k+2β
W θ(1−α)
2
(
k+βW (1−α)2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
εMUF∗
w∗+
k−2βW (1−θ)(1−α)
2
(
k+βW (1−α)2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
εMUH∗
w.
C Derivation of eq. (30)
By normalizing the previous period nominal wage to unity, the current nominal wage can be
expressed as
W ( j) = 1+w( j).
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Consider that each union takes as given the wage set by other unions and that the wage is the
same for all the workers of union u. From eq. (10) I have that
∂W
∂w(u)
=
∂
∂w(u)
[∫ 1
0
W ( j)1−σ d j
] 1
1−σ
=
∂
∂w(u)
[∫
j∈u
W ( j)1−σ d j+
∫
j/∈u
W ( j)1−σ d j
] 1
1−σ
=
1
n
[
W (u)
W
]−σ
.
D Derivation of union’s first-order condition
The u-th union first-order condition is obtained by solving (8)
−nk
∫
j∈u
logL( j)
∂ logL( j)
∂ logW ( j)
d j+
W ( j)L( j)
PC( j)
[
1+
∂L( j)
∂W ( j)
∂W ( j)
∂ logW ( j)
1
L( j)
− ∂P
∂W ( j)
∂W ( j)
∂ logW ( j)
1
P
]
= 0.
(53)
From firms profit maximization, it turns out that in a symmetric equilibrium WL/(PC) = α .
Thus, I may write (53) as follows:
α(1+ εh− sh) = kεh logL, (54)
where sh ≡ ∂ logP/∂ logW ( j). Using the definition of η into (54) yields eq. (33) in the text.
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